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5 JAN 1972

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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5 JANUARY 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 1)


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FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention i

INDOCHINA

DRV, PRG Score President's TV Interview as "Brazen, Insolent"	1
TASS Report Notes President Intends To Raise POW Issue in PRC	5
DRV Claims 24 Planes, 7 POWs During Late December Bombing	6
Hanoi Hails "Proper Execution" of VPA Order on Vigilance	8
PRG, NFLSV Denounce Strikes Against DRV, Warn of "Punishment"	11
USSR Government Statement Scores Bombing; Aid Accord Signed	13
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator Echoes Foreign Ministry on Bombing	16
Year-End Reviews Optimistic on Struggle in South Vietnam	18

SINO-SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS

Sino-Soviet Troubles Mark Onset of Year of Nixon Visits	21
Peking Sees Regrouping of Forces in International Community	22
Moscow Warns of "Major Political Deals" Between PRC, U.S.	24

AFRICA

Soviet Propaganda on Rhodesia Includes Anti-Peking Barbs	27
--	----

PRC-JAPAN

Peking Reiterates Its Claim to Sovereignty Over Senkakus	29
--	----

CHINA

Joint Editorial at New Year Skirts Leadership Issue	30
PRC Claims Record Harvest, Ten Percent Industrial Gain	31
Hunan Holds Second Party Plenum, First Province to Do So	33

MIDDLE EAST

Moscow Sees U.S. Phantom Decision as Threatening Peace	34
Primakov Urges Political Settlement in Year-End Review	35

YUGOSLAVIA

Foreign Currency Issue Resolved, Tito Crackdown Continues	39
---	----

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Belated Publication of Stalin-Era History Announced	42
---	----

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5 JANUARY 1972

- i -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 27 DECEMBER 1971-2 JANUARY 1972

<u>Moscow (2976 items)</u>	<u>Peking (1472 items)</u>
Indochina (9%)	Domestic Issues (36%)
[U.S. Air Raids (--)]	Indian-Pakistani 13% (21%)
Podgorny New Year's (--)	Conflict 9%
Greetings to Soviet People	[Chinese Protests (1%) 5%]
China (5%)	Indochina (21%) 14%
Cuban Revolution (0.1%)	[U.S. Air Raids (3%) 7%]
Anniversary	New Year's Joint (--) 5%
Cuban President	Editorial
Dorticos in USSR	Japanese Claim to Senkakus
Chilean CP Anniversary	Iraqi Government (1%) 4%
Delegation in PRC	PEOPLE'S DAILY Editorial (--) 4%
Indian-Pakistani Conflict	on UNGA Session
Mars 2 & 3 Probes (3%)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* The China figure excludes commentaries on China's role in the Indian-Pakistani conflict. These commentaries are counted in the figure on India-Pakistan and amount to roughly one-half of the total on the conflict last week and two-thirds this week.

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FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

The heavy, continuous U.S. air strikes against the DRV from 26 through 30 December prompted daily protests from the DRV Foreign Ministry, with ministry statements on the 26th and 29th and lower-level routine protests by the ministry spokesman on the other three days. Hanoi claims the Administration had to announce the end of the five-day bombing because it was "being defeated militarily and politically." But at the same time propagandists point to U.S. threats of more bombing and call for continued implementation of the 28 December VPA High Command order on vigilance. President Nixon's 2 January TV interview is assailed as the latest evidence of U.S. intent to continue the strikes. Hanoi's reaction is typified by a 4 January editorial in the party daily NHAN DAN which asked how Nixon could be so naive as to hope to win by following in the footsteps of his predecessor, whose air war against the DRV was defeated.

Moscow's official protest on the air strikes was not issued until 30 December, but it came in the form of a government statement rather than at the foreign ministry level at which Peking as well as Hanoi had protested. On the same day Moscow also reported the signing of an agreement on "additional" Soviet assistance to the DRV. The government statement was couched in relatively mild terms, and it may have been issued at the high level to suggest greater support than had come from Peking. Moscow continues to link the U.S. air strikes with Peking's "rapprochement" with the United States. And a TASS report of the President's TV interview pointedly notes his remark that the POW issue would be raised during his PRC visit.

Peking's only substantial comment on the air strikes following the 29 December PRC Foreign Ministry statement is a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 31st which, like the statement, avoids personal criticism of the President. Peking media have not yet mentioned his TV interview. A Chinese speaker at a 4 January ceremony opening a Vietnamese art exhibition made a passing reference to the strikes. But Li Hsien-nien did not mention them in a speech at a banquet on the 29th for a visiting Iraqi delegation.

DRV, PRG SCORE PRESIDENT'S TV INTERVIEW AS "BRAZEN, INSOLENT"

The Vietnamese communists reacted promptly to the President's 2 January radio-TV interview with CBS correspondent Dan Rather,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 2 -

with statements by both the PRG and DRV spokesmen in Paris and routine Hanoi radio and Front media comment. There has as yet been no such authoritative propaganda as a NHAN DAN Commentator article, the standard Hanoi vehicle for reacting to major Presidential announcements.

The first monitored reaction came in a Hanoi radio commentary early on the 4th--some 24 hours after the interview. Although the statements in Paris were transmitted to Hanoi on VNA's service channel on the 3d, they were not carried in DRV and Front media until after the Hanoi radio commentary had been repeated several times on the 4th. The statements did not deal with the details of the President's interview in declaring--in the words of the DRV spokesman--that his remarks again demonstrated that the Nixon policy is one of prolonging the war in South Vietnam, expanding it to all of Indochina, threatening the sovereignty and security of the DRV, refusing to negotiate seriously at Paris, and continuing to oppose the PRG's seven-point proposal.

The initial Hanoi radio commentary said that "Nixon brazenly said he had personally ordered the bombing raids against North Vietnam," and it took issue with his justification of the "acts of war" by repeating the "old, groundless allegation" that North Vietnam has violated the understanding which led to the bombing halt in 1968. The commentary countered this "sheer falsehood" by saying it was the United States which had "brazenly violated" its commitment to halt the bombing totally and unconditionally. As documentation of its claim, it observed that former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford had said that he did not understand the reasons given by the Nixon Administration to justify the recent bombing raids. Without explicitly mentioning the bombing halt, the DRV Paris spokesman had cryptically said that the President in his interview "once again made unreasonable and deceitful allegations and repeated the absurd history of the so-called 'secret understandings,' which have been resolutely rejected by us and condemned by world public opinion . . ." This ambiguity accords with other comment on the recent air strikes.

A 4 January NHAN DAN editorial rounding up the Moscow and Peking and other communist and worldwide condemnations of the air strikes included a passage on the President's interview. As broadcast by Hanoi radio--some five hours after the initial commentary on the President--the editorial said that "everyone"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 3 -

has pointed out that the air strikes again proved, among other things, that the Nixon Doctrine has gone bankrupt, and that "public opinion has also exposed Nixon's boasts that the war is going to end and that the United States is gradually withdrawing from Vietnam." Claiming that the President had been "seriously upset" by his "serious" military defeats in the air strikes and worldwide protests, the editorial said that in his interview "Nixon sought by every means to defend his crimes while continuing to make insolent threats How can people believe in his arguments about 'self-protective reaction?'" The editorial went on to attribute to the "U.S. Government," rather than the President, a series of arguments to justify the strikes--"self-protective reaction, measures aimed at protecting the lives of U.S. troops and cutting off supplies and preventing losses in Laos, and action taken because U.S. POWs have not been released." Insisting that the real motive behind the President's move was to salvage something from his "heavy, basic defeats" throughout Indochina, the editorial labeled U.S. arguments as "inconsistent and illogical" and "smelling of banditry."

POW ISSUE Initial comment on the 4th and 5th assails the President's justification of the air strikes so long as American prisoners are held by the communists. But propagandists skirt the exchange in which the President asserted that in Paris "the communists had totally rejected" the notion of a prisoner release if the United States set a deadline for withdrawal. The only known reference in available Vietnamese communist propaganda is in two VNA English-language news items on the 5th which quote Senator McGovern's contradiction of the President's remarks. These VNA items have not been repeated for domestic Vietnamese audiences to date. VNA says without comment:

Senator George McGovern said in a television interview Monday that President Nixon had deceived the American people with his statement that his idea of releasing captured U.S. armymen in return for a declared deadline for American withdrawal from Southeast Asia was rejected by North Vietnam negotiators. It is simply not true--and the President knows it is not true--that our negotiators in Paris have ever discussed with the North Vietnamese the question of total U.S. withdrawal from Indochina in conjunction with the release of our prisoners, the Senator said.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 4 -

Both the PRG and DRV spokesmen in Paris had merely said cryptically that the President made "deceitful" or "perfidious" statements in an attempt to shift the blame for the deadlock of the Paris talks which has prevented the repatriation of prisoners. But both also refer to points one and two of the PRG proposal--on withdrawal and a settlement in the South--in the more intransigent terms which have been fairly standard since last fall. Thus the PRG statement, after calling for withdrawal, says "at the same time" the United States must "immediately give up all support" of Thieu. And the DRV spokesman spells out some of the hardened elaboration that Pham Van Dong had voiced during his November visit to Peking. For example, the spokesman specified that the United States must end all action in both zones of Vietnam. And a Hanoi radio commentary on the 5th repeats this and goes on to say under point two that the United States must "renounce its support for and commitments to the fascist Thieu clique."

Hanoi, of course ignores the President's remark that the prisoner issue might be brought up during both his February trip to Peking and his Moscow visit* next May and his revelation that the issue has already been discussed with both the Chinese and the Soviets--between Kissinger and Chou En-lai in Peking in July and October and with Gromyko in Washington in late September.

* Hanoi studiously avoided any explicit mention of the President's trip to Peking despite its vitriolic anti-Chinese polemic during July and August. The only known explicit mention of either trip in Hanoi media appeared in the November issue of a journal of the Central Committee's Propaganda and Training Department THOI SU PHO THONG (CURRENT EVENTS). The article charged the President with "using vague hints to create the illusion that those trips will help the United States to resolve the Vietnam problem." The only known reference to the Peking visit in Front media also appeared in November in a broadcast in English to U.S. servicemen on the 25th which quoted a U.S. general as dismissing the trip as having no significance for the Vietnamese problem.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 5 -

TASS REPORT NOTES PRESIDENT INTENDS TO RAISE POW ISSUE IN PRC

Moscow's fullest account of President Nixon's 2 January radio-TV interview is provided by TASS in a 3 January dispatch which selectively reports his comments on Vietnam. TASS says that the President "refused" to give assurances that by election day there would be no Americans anywhere in Indochina, and that he pointed out that if no progress were made in negotiations "we will have to continue to retain a residual force in Vietnam" and "continue the possibility of air strikes on the North Vietnamese." TASS says that the President "side-stepped" a question asking how, then, he could campaign saying he had ended the American involvement. The report notes that the President again tried to "justify" the bombing by saying that it is necessary to protect American troops and "get back" the POWs. TASS interjects the observation that the United States has never answered the PRG's "constructive proposal" that would create conditions for solving the Vietnam issue and "all questions connected with this problem."

The TASS report mentions that the President declared his intention to raise the question of American POWs during his visit to Peking, but fails to note that he also said he had talked to Gromyko about the question and intended to discuss it during his visit to Moscow as well. A Moscow radio domestic service report on 2 January similarly picks up the President's expression of intention to discuss POWs in Peking and cites speculation by "journalists" that General Haig, now leading the advance delegation in Peking, has been "authorized to give an explanation of the recent American bombing raids on North Vietnam."

There has been no comment on the interview in the Soviet press and the only available Moscow radio comment comes in a Mandarin-language broadcast on 5 January which, in the course of criticism of Peking's "collusion" with the United States in Indochina, refers to the President's remarks. It says the President indicated that the United States hoped to achieve a dual objective with the bombings--to "intimidate" the people of the DRV and inflict heavy losses on them, and to demonstrate that the United States has no desire to withdraw from Southeast Asia and that it is prepared to solve problems by force. A 4 January commentary on the "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress, broadcast in English to Asia, takes issue with the President's reasoning that the bombing is necessary to free the POWs and protect the lives of U.S. troops. It acknowledges that if the present withdrawal rate continues by the end of the year there will be only some 25-35,000 U.S. troops left in Vietnam, but says that this means that the war will go on "for at least another year," and points out that everything the President said is essentially the same as was being said three years ago.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 6 -

DRV CLAIMS 24 PLANES, 7 POWS DURING LATE DECEMBER BOMBING

Hanoi's claim that eight U.S. planes were downed and two pilots captured on 30 December, the fifth and last day of the continuous U.S. bombing of North Vietnam which had begun on 26 December, came first in a Hanoi radio report on the 30th. A few minutes later Hanoi broadcast the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement charging that the Nixon Administration "again mobilized hundreds of aircraft to continue to carry out air raids against many densely populated areas including the Trang pagoda and a suburban area of the Vinh provincial capital" in Quang Binh and Nghe An provinces. Although the spokesman says that "hundreds" of planes "again" bombed on the 30th, the four earlier protests had not mentioned numbers, instead referring to "many" or "many waves." A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 30th, however, says that since 17 December the "U.S. imperialists" have sent "hundreds" of jet fighters to repeatedly bomb or strafe many populated areas.

Like the earlier protests, the 30 December one says that the bombings "cynically violate" the U.S. commitment to end the bombing of the DRV and are "an insolent challenge to the broad public opinion in the world and the progressive people in the United States." It says that at a time when the President "is clamoring that he is 'finding every possible means to bring home all American POWs', the U.S. war escalation against the DRV will but lengthen the list of captured American militarymen." It predicts heavier defeats for the Nixon Administration "the more obstinate and truculent" it is.

The spokesman's statement notes the downing of the eight aircraft but does not mention the two captured pilots, saying only that "many" other planes were damaged and a number of pilots killed or captured. The initial radio announcement had specified that seven of the claimed planes were downed in Nghe An and one in Quang Binh. The pilots, however, were reportedly captured in Nghi Xuan district of Ha Tinh Province--which borders both Nghe An and Quang Binh. The 31 December NHAN DAN editorial said that "the Ha Tinh armed forces and people, in coordination with the Nghe An armed forces and people, captured aggressor pilots who had been shot down." The radio report additionally said that the armed forces and people of the coastal district of Nghe An and Ha Tinh

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 7 -

"courageously fought the enemy coming to rescue aggressor pilots who had fallen into the sea." And it reported that a total of 19 planes were downed during the five days of bombing: ten in Nghe An, seven in Quang Binh and two in Thanh Hoa. Hanoi on 1 January reported the downing of an unmanned reconnaissance plane over Nghe An that day, bringing Hanoi's total of downed planes to 3,428.*

The downing of the eight planes and the capture of the two pilots was immediately acclaimed that day, the 30th, by a VPA High Command communique which "warmly commends the fresh exploits of the armed forces in Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and reaffirms the determination of the Vietnamese people to foil any new adventurous acts taken by the U.S. aggressors against the DRV."

Just as it had presented four pilots at a press conference on 20 December, Hanoi on the 31st presents the two captured the day before. The conference was again held by the Information and Press Department of the DRV Foreign Ministry and foreign and local newsmen were again present. Ngo Dien, head of the press department, said the purpose of the conference was to give further evidence of the U.S. war escalation and its "ignominious failure." Newsmen were invited to go to a hospital to photograph a third U.S. pilot--captured on the 26th--who was injured. Citing the 29 December foreign ministry statement, Dien said that the bombing was "an extremely serious step of war escalation, a big crime and an impudent challenge to world public opinion." Referring to the VPA High Command communique of the 30th, which had also reported the downing of 19 planes in the five days of bombing, Dien recalled that downings during the 17-18 December action brought the total to 24 planes and seven U.S. pilots captured in the 17-30 December period. (The three prisoners were identified as David Wesley Hoffman and Norris Alphonso Charles, and Lynn Ellis Guenther, the injured pilot; brief statements attributed to them, giving their identity and thanking the Vietnamese for the treatment they had received, were carried by Hanoi radio in English to Southeast Asia on the 31st.)

* A 31 December Hanoi radio roundtable discussion on the Indo-Chinese peoples' victories in 1971 claimed that during the year 56 U.S. planes--"mostly jet fighters and one B-52"--were downed, a number it said was "markedly greater than in the previous year."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 8 -

Also on the 31st, the DRV War Crimes Commission held a press conference to denounce the U.S. "crimes" recently committed "against the civilian population in North Vietnam." The VNA account of the conference noted that "a film and an exhibition of photographs on these crimes" were shown. Newsmen were given a special communique by the commission detailing the alleged results of the U.S. bombings from 26 to 30 December. The communique spelled out the number of sorties and bombs used per day in a given province and detailed damages. No total of Vietnamese casualties was released; in some cases the numbers of people killed and injured were combined, but the various reports add up to at least 44 deaths.

The reported attacks against two hospitals during the raids prompted a statement by the DRV Ministry of Public Health on the 31st which denounced to the world public "the savage crimes" of the United States. It said that on the 26th, 27th and 29th "many flights" of aircraft attacked the provincial hospital of Thanh Hoa and the hospital in Dong Hoi, capital of Quang Binh, which had been destroyed prior to 1968 and had been rebuilt.

HANOI HAILS "PROPER EXECUTION" OF VPA ORDER ON VIGILANCE

The role of vigilance and combat readiness continues to be stressed in the propaganda as it has since the U.S. strikes on 17-18 December. There is frequent reference to the VPA High Command order, dated 28 December and released on the 29th, which called for continued vigilance and combat readiness.* The downing of eight planes on the 30th is hailed as an example of properly executing the order and comment frequently warns, in urging continued awareness, that additional U.S. attacks may be forthcoming. Thus the 30 December NHAN DAN editorial, claiming that the downings of U.S. planes have increased the North's "enthusiasm and confidence," cautions that the "U.S. aggressors are still very stubborn and warlike. They still cultivate the illusion of using their air force as a trump card to extricate themselves from total defeat on the Indochinese battlefield. They will commit other crimes." NHAN DAN says that from now until "total victory" the North "will have to continuously cope with the cunning plots and frenzied actions" of the United States "because the more it sustains heavy defeats in South Vietnam,

* See the 29 December TRENDS, pages 4-5.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 9 -

Laos, and Cambodia, the more intense its reckless actions against the DRV." It goes on to urge heightened vigilance on the part of the armed forces; earlier it had praised various specific units of the armed forces--for example, antiaircraft, air force, missile, radar, engineer, and signal units--for their role in defending North Vietnam in the past few days.

A radio broadcast on the 30th cites various defense preparations in response to the High Command order, noting, for example, that in Nghe An militia units in coastal areas "have built new watch towers and combat positions" from which they can attack commandos and "fight the enemy who may land by boats or by aircraft." In Thanh Hoa, the broadcast reports, the people and self-defense militia forces "in all localities, at all agencies and along all communications lines are expeditiously building or repairing many communications tunnels and trenches, shelters, and combat positions."

A Hanoi radio commentary on the 30th, hails the downing of the eight planes on 30 December as an example of executing the High Command order and notes that 19 planes have been downed in five consecutive days. It warns "Nixon and his subordinates": "The firepower of the Vietnamese armed forces and people throughout this heroic and indomitable country is a hatred-boiled firepower of an entire nation that is determined to fight and win. Definitely this firepower will reduce to ash the frenzied and perfidious intimidating allegations of the U.S. President and defense secretary, will burn all insidious and cruel war designs and tricks of the U.S. imperialists and will reduce to ash their Vietnamization policy."

A NHAN DAN editorial on the 31st also praises Nghe An and Quang Binh provinces for downing the eight planes in compliance with the VPA order, and hails the antiaircraft and missile units, and the artillery and self-defense militia forces "which resolutely fought off the enemy coming to rescue the aggressor pilots who had parachuted into the sea," as well as engineer and signal combatants. The editorial, observing that the United States "has not renounced its evil aggressive designs," warns that the U.S. "imperialists will resort to cunning tricks and criminal acts against the people in the northern part of our country." NHAN DAN urges cadres and combatants everywhere "to devote all their efforts to executing the High Command order." The editorial says that "our armed forces have achieved

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 10 -

close coordination of combat, raised an intense fire-net and directed stunning blows at the U.S. aggressor pilots."

The NHAN DAN editorial notes that some of the attacking planes came from bases in South Vietnam when it quotes "some panicky enemy pilots, who safely returned" to Da Nang after the air raids on the 29th, as saying that "North Vietnam's air defense forces are much stronger than they were in 1968" and the DRV's firepower better than ever before. While the editorial also mentions that U.S. planes used for the raids came from U.S. ships off the Vietnamese coast and bases in Thailand, as well as South Vietnam, only one of the official protests--the 29 December DRV Foreign Ministry statement--points out that the planes came from the three locations. The DRV War Crimes special communique released on the 31st refers only to the carriers and the bases in Thailand.

A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 31st also praises the antiaircraft and air force troops and militia and self-defense forces in the provinces which downed the eight planes on the 30th. Similarly suggesting there will be further raids, the editorial says that the U.S. "imperialists remain stubborn until their death. They still recklessly threaten to continue to strike the North if the DRV resists U.S. aircraft."* It warns that U.S. planes which violate DRV airspace "will certainly be downed." And the paper says that "everywhere in the North, there is a determination to fight and win, to strictly carry out the High Command's orders, to sharpen one's vigilance, to deal violent blows at the enemy and to wholeheartedly" assist the South.

* VNA on 30 December atypically carried an account of the downing of one of the U.S. planes on the 18th by a MIG. Earlier statements by the U.S. Command in Saigon on the involvement of MIGs during the 17-18 December weekend had typically been ignored by Hanoi.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 11 -

PRG, NFLSV DENOUNCE STRIKES AGAINST DRV, WARN OF "PUNISHMENT"

Official PRG and NFLSV protests denouncing the 26-30 December U.S. bombing raids against North Vietnam were not issued until the day the air strikes ended. A PRG Foreign Ministry statement* and a NFLSV Central Committee statement on the 30th condemned the raids, and the air strikes were scored a day later in a statement from the Vietnam Alliance of National Democratic Peace Forces. Both the PRG Foreign Ministry and the Vietnam Alliance statements voice support for the DRV Foreign Ministry statement issued on the 29th and echo its claim that the DRV is a sovereign and independent country, with a right to self-defense. Neither statement, however, characterizes it as a "socialist" country as the DRV statement had. Both statements score the U.S. justifications for the raids--that they were "protective reaction" raids and that North Vietnam had violated the "understandings" between it and the United States--as an attempt to deceive public opinion. The PRG statement calls the strikes "extremely serious criminal acts" and a "premeditated step of war escalation." It charges that the raids--along with the intensification of the war throughout Indochina, "the evasion of the PRG's seven-point peace initiative," and U.S. "sabotage" of the Paris talks--"have further laid bare the Nixon Administration's aggressive, stubborn, and bellicose nature."

South Vietnamese communist comment uniformly warns the United States that its action against the North will bring a response from the South. Thus the PRG statement says that the South Vietnamese people are "determined to turn their hatred into stormy attacks on the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys and duly punish them for any one of their criminal acts against our people in the North." The NFLSV statement, expressing indignation "at the new heinous crimes" against the North, says that the United States "is mistaken if it thinks that its frantic war acts can shake the combat will of the Vietnamese people. All its aggressive designs, however brutal, will only incense the people and army in both zones. . . ."

* The earlier DRV charges of U.S. intrusions and strikes on the 17th and 18th were similarly echoed in a 21 December PRG Foreign Ministry statement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

VBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 12 -

Comment from the South does not reiterate many of Hanoi's claims concerning the raids, although a Liberation Radio commentary on the 30th does cite some of the details, including the allegations that 24 U.S. planes have been downed since the 17th and that four pilots were captured on the 18th and two more on the 30th. An NFLSV/PRG message to the Vietnam Fatherland Front and the DRV Government, broadcast by Liberation Radio on 30 December, hails the "victories" of the North but fails to mention any specific figures, instead citing the downing of "scores" of aircraft and capture of "many" pilots. An LPA commentary on the 1st echoes Hanoi comment when it says that President Nixon "had to order a halt" to the bombings on the 30th and calls this action an admission of the Administration's "glaring failure."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 13 -

USSR GOVERNMENT STATEMENT SCORES BOMBING; AID ACCORD SIGNED

Moscow waited until the end of the five-day series of heavy U.S. air raids on the DRV, which began on 26 December, to condemn them in a USSR Government statement on the 30th. While Moscow's statement is at a higher level than the DRV Foreign Ministry statements it supports and the 29 December PRC Foreign Ministry statement, it is nevertheless cast in relatively mild terms. It routinely promises to continue giving the DRV the "necessary assistance"; simultaneously, Soviet media report a new agreement providing additional Soviet aid to "further strengthen the DRV's defense capacity." The brief announcement of the agreement is published on the front pages of PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA directly below the government statement.

Other propaganda on the bombing includes further protest statements by Soviet public organizations and the usual protest meetings in factories and enterprises throughout the country which have customarily followed Soviet Government statements on Indochina. Routine-level attention includes reportage of Vietnamese communist comment and reports of protests being voiced throughout the world, including the United States. TASS on 31 December briefly cited critical remarks by Senators Fulbright, Church, McGovern, Muskie, Humphrey, and Mansfield.

Many Moscow commentators continue to link the U.S. decision to initiate the bombings with Peking's policies of "rapprochement" with the United States, particularly President Nixon's forthcoming visit.

GOVERNMENT STATEMENT Although the USSR Government statement scores the "barbarous" bombings and notes, like routine propaganda, that Secretary Laird said that they "are being made on instructions of the White House," it does not mention President Nixon by name. (A 25 February 1971 government statement on the Laos incursion warned that actions of the United States "undermine the very foundations on which interstate relations are built . . . and cannot but affect Soviet-American relations too.")

The statement once again, like routine propaganda, says that the aggression shows the "hypocrisy" of American statements about the "curtailment" of U.S. involvement in Indochina and about striving for a peaceful settlement, and shows that Washington really seeks a "military solution." It says nothing

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 14 -

about the Paris talks. And it also fails to specifically mention the PRG's seven-point proposal although it does demand an end to U.S. aggression, full and unconditional troop withdrawal from Indochina, and respect for the Indochinese peoples' right to solve their own affairs.

BACKGROUND: The most recent Soviet Government statement on Indochina was on 25 February 1971, belatedly scoring the Laos incursion which had been announced on the 8th. Since the official cessation of the sustained U.S. bombing in November 1968, Moscow has normally supported DRV Foreign Ministry statements on U.S. bombing raids only with lower-level propaganda.* The 21 September 1971 strikes were denounced in a belated 1 October TASS statement,** apparently to place Moscow officially on record in support of the DRV before Podgorny's arrival in Hanoi on 3 October. The air strikes of March 1971 prompted no such formal statement. On 16 December 1970 a Soviet Government statement had belatedly supported the 10 December DRV party-government appeal for vigilance in the wake of the 21 November raids and had denounced President Nixon's 10 December press conference containing "threats" to resume bombing. The 21 November raids had earlier been condemned in a TASS statement on the 23d. A Soviet Government statement, read by Kosygin at a 4 May 1970 press conference, had included a denunciation of the 1-2 May bombings of the DRV but was mainly concerned with the incursion into Cambodia.

AID AGREEMENT

Moscow media cryptically reported on the 30th that as a result of talks in Moscow "of major significance" an agreement was signed on the USSR's "additional assistance gratis" to "further strengthen the DRV's defense capacity." There has been no elaboration so far from Moscow and virtually no followup comment. VNA's 1 January report, however, says that the agreement, signed on 29 December, was for "supplementary non-refund military aid" to the DRV for 1972. VNA adds that the accord was signed by Soviet Col. Gen. G.S. Sidorovich, vice chairman of the State Committee for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, and the DRV charge d'affaires.

* Before the cessation of the sustained bombing Moscow had customarily supported the DRV on various developments in connection with the bombings with USSR Government statements.

** The TRENDS of 29 December 1971 on page 10 erroneously stated that the September strikes had prompted only routine comment.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 15 -

Other officials of the Soviet committee and a defense ministry representative attended the ceremony, as did the PRG Ambassador and the DRV military attache.

The aid agreement, although signed at a low level and receiving little publicity, takes on added interest in the wake of the air attacks. VNA quotes Sidorovich as expressing "indignation" at the latest bombing raids in a speech at the signing ceremony. The limited publicity given the current accord, however, is not without precedent. On 18 August 1971 TASS had similarly tersely reported the signing of agreements in Moscow on additional aid "to strengthen the DRV defense potentialities," giving neither the date of the accord nor the names of the signatories. VNA's report shed no further light on the circumstances of the signing, and the general secretiveness seemed to have been designed to cover up prolonged and difficult negotiations.* But Moscow does normally give considerable publicity to its aid agreements--both the usual annual ones, the most recent of which was signed on 7 October during Podgornyy's visit to Hanoi, and "supplementary" ones signed in June 1970 and November 1968.

ATTACKS ON PEKING Many Moscow commentators continue to link Peking's policy of "rapprochement" with the United States and its invitation to President Nixon with the U.S. decision to make the bombing raids. A RED STAR article by Lt. Col. Ponomarev on 31 December on Secretary Laird's year-end press conference even says that he "was ultimately compelled to make it understood" that the true purpose of the bombings was to "intimidate the peoples of Indochina before Nixon's trip to Peking."

Ignoring the 29 December PRC Foreign Ministry statement, some commentators continue to point to Peking's "silence" on or low-key response to the bombings. A PRAVDA article by Mayevskiy, as summarized by TASS on 4 January, says that "foreign commentators" feel that the new U.S. aggression "has a direct bearing" on the President's forthcoming visit to Peking and cites Sulzberger of the New York TIMES as saying that "the Chinese did not come out with energetic, to Peking's standards, objections." A roundup of foreign comment on

* The August 1971 agreement is discussed in the 18 August TRENDS, page 12, and the 25 August TRENDS, page 9.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 16 -

Peking's attitude in LITERARY GAZETTE on 1 January is preceded by the editorial comment that "the Peking press is writing about anything and everything except" the U.S. raids on the DRV. TASS on 30 December and a radio broadcast in Mandarin the next day cite an AFP report that in a 29 December speech for a visiting Iraqi delegation, Li Hsien-nien "did not say a word about the massive bombing of North Vietnam," and comment that this confirms Peking's intention not to draw attention to the American raids while the American advance delegation is in the PRC.

The only available Moscow acknowledgments of the PRC Foreign Ministry statement are in Mandarin-language commentaries by Vasiliyev broadcast on 31 December and 2 January* which say that the U.S. "ruling clique" has "completely ignored" the statement because it knows that Peking's "serious warnings" and "verbal threats" are not worthy of attention. Vasiliyev adds that some of the most intensive bombing came after Peking issued the statement.

PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTATOR ECHOES FOREIGN MINISTRY ON BOMBING

The 29 December PRC Foreign Ministry statement condemning the U.S. bombings is followed by a 31 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which denounces the air strikes without recalling the foreign ministry statement. The raids are given little attention in other comment, and as yet Peking has not mentioned President Nixon's 2 January radio-TV interview.

The Commentator article does not directly criticize the President in claiming that the bombing of North Vietnam shows that the Nixon Administration's Vietnamization plan is suffering defeats. Similarly, the PRC Foreign Ministry statement referred to the "Nixon Administration" but not to the President himself. While Peking does not attack the President on its own authority, a routine-level NCNA commentary on 30 December employs the device of quoting statements by American spokesmen to show

* TASS has not reported the PRC statement. The 13 December 1970 PRC party-government statement supporting the DRV appeal was not reported by TASS until the 17th--a report which was published in PRAVDA on the 18th--after the release of the belated 16 December Soviet Government statement supporting the DRV appeal.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FDIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 17 -

President Nixon's personal responsibility for the bombings. Thus NCNA notes that Secretary Laird, in his 27 December press conference, disclosed that the raids were approved by the President, and it cites White House spokesman Ziegler for the statement that the bombings are "totally consistent" with President Nixon's stated policies. Adding that the raids have aroused widespread domestic and foreign condemnation, NCNA says 30 Democratic Representatives sent the President a telegram on the 28th urging that he stop the current bombing, and it cites an unnamed Democratic Senator as saying that the bombings show the bankruptcy of the "Nixon policy of Vietnamization."

The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, in language reminiscent of the 24 December Commentator article scoring the 18 December air intrusions, charges that the new "air crime" has "exposed the aggressive features of U.S. imperialism" and "torn off its peace mask with regard to the Vietnam question." It scores the U.S. imperialists for trying to justify their action by saying that the raids "are for withdrawing their forces from South Vietnam," and repeats that if the United States really wants to withdraw it can do so unconditionally and completely without anyone standing in the way. Commentator recalls that the United States has all along refused to reply to the PRG seven-point proposal. The article labels as "shameless sophistry" U.S. statements that the bombing is of "limited duration" and not in violation of U.S. commitments to cease the bombing. After again praising the Indochinese peoples' "splendid new exploits," PEOPLE'S DAILY reiterates that the Chinese people will, as always, "resolutely support" the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples, and it expresses confidence that the "iron bastion" of the three Indochinese people fighting in unity will defeat any new U.S. military adventures.

A passing reference to the bombings was made by Shih Shao-hua, "a leading member of the cultural group under the State Council," in a speech at a 4 January ceremony opening a Vietnamese art exhibition. According to NCNA, he briefly condemned U.S. imperialism for recently bombing the DRV "savagely and repeatedly," and expressed the indignation of the Chinese people and their "firm support" for the DRV Foreign Ministry statements. He reiterated that the Chinese people "firmly support and assist" the people of Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries in their war against U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 18 -

aggression "until final victory." Li Hsien-nien attended the ceremony but did not speak. Speaking at a 29 December banquet for a visiting Iraqi delegation, Li failed to mention the bombing, judging from the NCNA summary of his speech.

YEAR-END REVIEWS OPTIMISTIC ON STRUGGLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Vietnamese communist propaganda on the fighting in 1971 claims that the United States has failed in its efforts to prepare the ARVN to replace U.S. troops, has not met its pacification goals, and has not been able to strengthen and stabilize the Saigon government. The propaganda repeatedly stresses that the strongest allied efforts were "strategically" defeated and that the way is now open for the "complete" defeat of allied forces. While this may merely be rhetoric to bolster the morale of the communist forces, some of the language used suggests genuine optimism on the course of the war.

PLAF COMMUNIQUE Military developments in South Vietnam during the past year were authoritatively assessed in a 24 December communique of the PLAF Command, publicized by Hanoi and PRG media on 3 January. While reflecting the reduced level of military action in South Vietnam during 1971, the communique exudes confidence about the future. It argues that the PLAF and "people" have frustrated the most severe allied efforts to win a "decisive victory" for Vietnamization and that, with U.S. and other foreign troops withdrawing and the ARVN "seriously disintegrating," the PLAF is "fully capable of defeating the Saigon puppet army even if it received more U.S. dollars, weapons, and air support." It routinely claims that the balance of forces is tipping more and more in favor of the communist forces and then adds cryptically: "All the three kinds of our armed forces are being deployed for attack on the enemy in all the three strategic zones"--the mountains, plains, and urban areas.

Discussing the alleged decline of the ARVN, the communique claims Saigon's troops have never faced "so serious a collapse" since the Tet offensive in 1968 and that they have never surrendered or been captured in such numbers as in 1971. It claims that a total of nearly 300,000 Saigon troops were put out of action throughout all of Indochina during the past year.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

5 JANUARY 1972

- 19 -

For the second year in a row, the year-end communique's tally of alleged allied losses in South Vietnam contains lower claims than the previous year's.* The communique asserts that its forces in South Vietnam during 1971 wiped out a total of nearly 250,000 allied troops, a figure sharply reduced from the 420,000 allied troops which the PLAF supposedly "annihilated" in 1970. (The peak year for the communists, according to their statistics, was 1969 when 645,000 allied troops were allegedly put out of action in South Vietnam.)

Claimed casualties among U.S. and other foreign troops are even more dramatically reduced from the previous year, the current communique claiming 20,000 non-Vietnamese troops wiped out in 1971 while the communique a year ago said that 110,000 foreign troops were among the 1970 casualties. Alleged allied material losses are also down from the previous year. Thus the communique claims 1,800 aircraft downed or destroyed in 1971 in comparison with the 5,900 aircraft claimed in 1970. Similarly, 8,000 military vehicles were allegedly wrecked or captured in 1971, while 14,000 were claimed in 1970.

OTHER COMMENT The PLAF Command's optimistic evaluation of the communists' military position in South Vietnam and elsewhere in Indochina has been echoed in other propaganda, including editorials in the 4 January issues of NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN pegged to the PLAF communique. Thus, the 4 January NHAN DAN editorial reiterated that the "great strategic" victories of 1971 created "a new and very favorable offensive position" for the "southern revolution," and that "the PLAF is strong enough to completely defeat the Saigon puppet army." The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial praised "noticeable" PLAF progress in "coordinated combat involving various armed branches and in fighting big battles of annihilation" and it claimed that the allies, following "their defeat in early 1971," were "no longer capable of launching large-scale operations." The paper also underlined the importance of building up local political and military forces and other tasks--"of the greatest strategic importance"--aimed at defeating rural pacification.

Prior to the release of the PLAF communique, its tone was anticipated in the 1 January NHAN DAN editorial which maintained

* The PLAF Command communique on fighting in 1970 was analyzed in the 6 January 1971 TRENDS, pages 9-10.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

POTS TRENDS

5 JANUARY 1972

- 20 -

that "the puppet troops cannot fight alone without the U.S. forces as their prop, and U.S. aircraft are not strong enough to protect them." It held that the U.S. "war of aggression is going downhill" and that the situation is favorable for the Indochinese "people" to completely defeat the "U.S. aggressors and their lackeys."

A Liberation Radio editorial marking the New Year, broadcast on 31 December, also expressed communist confidence in strong terms. It maintained that the PLAF's regular troops are in good shape, have experience in big battles, and "are capable of launching big, annihilating attacks on various battlefields." The editorial held that the allies are, among other things, trying to "avoid big annihilating battles," to save Vietnamization and lessen losses. It predicted "more difficulties and hardships" for its side in "a very arduous but glorious phase of struggle," and stated that the armed forces and "people" will develop their "winning position" and "stage relentless offensives" with determination to "intensify their activities on all fronts and in all three strategic zones."

Other PRG comment included an article in the army paper QUAN GIAI PHONG, broadcast by Liberation Radio on 4 January. The commentary repeated standard claims and went on, after pointing to the alleged failure of the pacification effort, to assert that "new concerted uprisings will break out throughout the South, fierce ones that will completely smash the pacification scheme" and which will be "a painful blow to the Vietnamization strategy and the Nixon Doctrine." Discussing the urban areas, the commentary maintained that the "people's struggles" in the cities are "preparations for revolutionary storms" and "are capable of turning into a revolutionary high tide which will make the cities the enemy's basic weakness and our important political strength."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 21 -

SINO-SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS

SINO-SOVIET TROUBLES MARK ONSET OF YEAR OF NIXON VISITS

The collision of Soviet and Chinese interests in South Asia and in the United Nations, intensifying the strains arising from developments in the two communist powers' triangular relations with the United States, has brought Sino-Soviet relations to an acrimonious state at the onset of the new year. The policy review in Peking's authoritative New Year's Day joint editorial, a paean to the successes of Chouist moves in the world arena, offers a rationale for Chinese efforts to gain leverage in the international community in order to compete with the two super-powers and to take advantage of their clashes of interest. The editorial confers Mao's sanction on these policies by quoting the chairman as stating that international affairs must be settled through consultation by all concerned and not be left to the two big powers.

The Chinese editorial, which sharply denounces "the Brezhnev renegade clique" while sparing President Nixon any direct attack, repeats the charge of unspecified conspiracies by Liu Shao-chi "and other swindlers who had illicit relations with foreign countries."* In the context of Peking's invitation to the President and the purge of Lin Piao and other military leaders, such a charge raises the question of possible opposition by the purge victims to developments in Sino-U.S. relations in the past year--developments which Peking interpreted as part of an effort to isolate the Soviet Union as its main enemy. While Moscow has not cited this charge and has treaded carefully in discussing the purge, Soviet comment has given some play to suggestions that the recent Chinese internal upheaval is connected with the President's impending visit. Moscow has also complained that strongly anti-Soviet figures in Peking are involved in these developments, and an article in the Soviet military organ RED STAR on 29 December chose to raise the border issue in discussing the Chinese leadership struggle in connection with Peking's moves within the triangular setting.

* A similar charge was also made in major editorials on 1 July and 1 December. The 1 December editorial, a veiled explanation of the recent purge, included the charge in a passage recalling conspiracies by Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, Peng Te-huai, and Huang Ko-cheng--an intriguing list in that these former purge victims were tainted with suspicion of connivance with the Soviets.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 22 -

In a significant departure from its heretofore notably restrained treatment of Chou En-lai, Moscow has rebuked the Chinese premier for his anti-Soviet stand and has suggested that he is receptive to deals with the United States which others in Peking would oppose. Also in anticipation of the President's visit to Peking, the Soviets have seized on the U.S. air strikes against the DRV as an occasion for warning Hanoi that its interests are menaced by Sino-U.S. developments. In fact, Moscow's extensive polemical campaign keyed to the Indian-Pakistani conflict, featuring charges of Sino-U.S. collusion and of Chinese betrayal of the national liberation movement, can be interpreted in large measure as intended for the benefit of Hanoi and other such targets of the Sino-Soviet rivalry.

PEKING SEES REGROUPING OF FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Peking's New Year's Day joint editorial provides a review of the world situation designed to justify moves toward enhancing the PRC's influence in the international community and its maneuverability vis-a-vis the superpowers. Stressing the clashes of interests between the two superpowers as well as those dividing the latter from the "small and medium countries" and the third world countries being championed by Peking, the editorial sums up the world situation as being one of "global upheaval." Similarly, a lengthy NCNA review on 30 December portraying growing opposition to dominance by the superpowers explained that political forces in the world arena are regrouping in a process of "great upheaval, great division, and great reorganization."

The formulation regarding a great upheaval and regrouping of international forces was revived last August in the wake of Peking's announcement of its invitation to President Nixon.* This significant cue, which figured in a major policy statement in November 1965 signaling Peking's rejection of any accommodation with Moscow despite pressures within the communist movement to close ranks behind the Vietnamese comrades, serves to give notice of important policy developments such as the shifts that produced the invitation to the President and Peking's flexible moves in the international community. Likewise, the quotation from Mao

* The use of the formulation at that time is discussed in the TRENDS of 1 September 1971, pages 18-19.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 23 -

calling for consultation by all concerned in determining international affairs justifies Peking's recourse to the diplomatic and negotiating tracks in place of its former emphasis on obstructionist and insurrectionist approaches. "Gone are the days," the editorial observes, when the super-powers could decide the destinies of other countries by "making deals behind their backs."

At a time of hostility toward Moscow and relative restraint toward Washington, the joint editorial directs its animosity mainly at the Soviets. Most notably, where the 1971 New Year's editorial denounced "Nixon's reactionary rule" while soft-pedaling attacks on the Soviet leadership, the 1972 editorial does not mention the President but assails "the Brezhnev renegade clique" for oppressing its people and attempting to extend its influence throughout the world. The editorial charges that Moscow has colluded with the United States in "nuclear deals," sold out the GDR on the Berlin question, threatened the Balkans, undermined the armed struggle of the Palestinians and Arabs, "and, above all, shamelessly and flagrantly supported the Indian reactionaries' armed aggression against Pakistan."

Implicitly offering a rationale for negotiating with the United States in order to cope with an expansive Soviet Union, the editorial points out that the "powers of aggression" of the United States have been "enormously weakened" in the Indochina war and that there has been a "profound change" in the balance of forces between the United States and its capitalist competitors. These judgments reflect Peking's optimistic reactions in the past year to developments in Indochina and in the political and economic relations among the capitalist countries. Most recently, in reacting to the U.S. air strikes against the DRV, Peking went no further than necessary in condemning Washington while implying that the North Vietnamese and their allies in Indochina could handle the situation and that ongoing Sino-U.S. developments were not in jeopardy. Shortly after the series of concentrated U.S. air raids, Peking announced on 3 January that an American advance party arrived that day to prepare for President Nixon's visit the next month. On the 4th Peking announced that Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei had held talks with the U.S. delegation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 24 -

In contrast to the 1971 New Year's editorial, which contained but a brief ritualistic call for liberation of Taiwan, the editorial this year includes a passage reaffirming Peking's position on the Taiwan question. The discussion is consistent with the major attention devoted to this issue in the past year and with Peking's diplomatic moves, reflecting concern over a possible tendency within the international community to accept the permanent alienation of Taiwan from the PRC. Thus, the editorial refers to "our compatriots" on the island who are "our brothers by flesh and blood." It reiterates opposition to formulas that would dilute Peking's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan--such as "one China, two governments"--and again demands the withdrawal of all U.S. armed forces. But there is no attempt to convey a sense of urgency or threat, the editorial closing its discussion of Taiwan by expressing confidence that "the day is bound to come" when the island will be liberated.

MOSCOW WARNS OF "MAJOR POLITICAL DEALS" BETWEEN PRC, U.S.

Moscow's bitter polemical campaign against the Chinese arising out of the Indian-Pakistani conflict and Sino-Soviet clashes in the United Nations has been seeded with charges of collusion and bargaining between Peking and Washington. The U.S. air strikes against the DRV in late December afforded Moscow further opportunity to develop this theme, accompanied by increasing references to President Nixon's Peking visit. Moscow has also sought to exploit the Chinese leadership crisis in its effort to discredit Peking's policies in general and the President's visit next month in particular.

A lengthy article by V. Vasiliyev in RED STAR on 29 December, based mainly on foreign as well as Chinese press reports for an account of the Chinese leadership crisis, explains that this development reflects more than a mere power struggle but is rooted in fundamental disagreements over domestic and foreign policy. According to Vasiliyev, the "Maoists" have had recourse to "shameless anti-Sovietism" in order to divert attention from the crisis and to gain time for consolidating their rule. Documenting Peking's anti-Soviet actions, Vasiliyev mentions not only the polemics over the Indian-Pakistani conflict but also raises the sensitive border question by noting that a provocative Chinese film on the 1969 border clashes is now showing in Peking. The film openly expresses territorial claims, Vasiliyev points out.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 25 -

Significantly, it is against this background that Vasilyev introduces the charge of Sino-U.S. collusion, citing the "world progressive forces" as having concluded that the Chinese position in the United Nations "confirms the possibility of major political deals between Peking and Washington at the expense of the interests of the peoples of different parts of the world during Nixon's forthcoming visit to Peking." Vasilyev himself concludes that the present course of "the great-power chauvinist Mao Tse-tung group," which is "hostile to Marxism-Leninism and hostile to socialism," is fraught with "serious consequences for the Chinese people themselves" and "conceals a threat to the interests of the peoples of other countries."

As in other recent Soviet comment, Vasilyev takes note of the rise in the Chinese hierarchy of individuals distinguished by "particularly unbridled anti-Sovietism"--namely, Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, and "Mao's son-in-law Yao Wen-yuan." Vasilyev cites the Western press as explaining that "the Chiang-Chang-Yao group" had reason to oppose the recently purged military leaders in view of the army's role in suppressing the Red Guards during the turmoil of the cultural revolution. Vasilyev remains vague, however, about what connection Lin Piao and the other purge victims might have with opposition to what he describes as Maoist policies contradicting "the objective requirements of China's development along the path of socialism and along the path of restoring friendship and international ties with the USSR."

Though Vasilyev does not repeat the personal attacks on Chou that have recently appeared in Soviet media, he alludes to Chou in an unfavorable context centering on the President's visit to Peking. Vasilyev quotes the Washington POST as saying that it is possible for the United States to have dealings with the Chinese leaders "who have been educated in the traditions of the mandarins," and that support should be given to those leaders who are removing the party and military figures whose interests are undermined by the President's visit. Again, Vasilyev fails to spell out Lin Piao's role in this scenario.

In a notable attempt to fish in troubled waters, a 31 December article by V. Filippov in SOVIET RUSSIA cites a pamphlet entitled "Problems of Sino-American Relations" which allegedly appeared for only a few hours in Peking last September. Basing himself on a summary of the pamphlet carried in a Japanese weekly, Filippov notes the pamphlet's claim that the announcement of the President's forthcoming visit to Peking provoked bitter

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 26 -

disputes in China. He quotes the pamphlet as saying the Peking leadership is divided into two lines on domestic and foreign issues, with Mao and Chou stressing that the Soviet Union poses a greater threat to China than the United States while unspecified "comrades who follow Marxist-Leninist theory" oppose this line as "a far-reaching rightwing deviation." In a remark that makes the pamphlet seem too good for Soviet purposes not to be false, Filippov quotes it as charging that Peking is "facilitating the implementation of American provocations against the DRV and of the policy of splitting Vietnam."

Earlier, on 22 December, the pamphlet had been the subject of a broadcast to the Chinese by the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress, a channel especially suited for the more provocative Soviet meddling in other countries' affairs. The broadcast version was notably more derisive toward Chou, attributing the invitation to the President to what it described as Chou's two-faced foreign policy. According to the broadcast, the pamphlet says many people in China disapprove of Chou's pro-U.S. policy and regard the invitation to the President as a surrender to U.S. imperialism.

In another difference between the two Soviet accounts of the pamphlet, Radio Peace and Progress quoted foreign observers as saying that Chou persuaded Mao to purge Lin, with whom Chou had a bitter dispute. The broadcast also went on to cite unnamed foreign specialists on China as suggesting that Chou himself may become a future purge victim should Mao need a scapegoat for difficulties resulting from the policy of Sino-U.S. rapprochement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 27 -

AFRICA

SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON RHODESIA INCLUDES ANTI-PEKING BARBS

Moscow sustains its largely one-sided polemic against Peking's policy regarding Rhodesia, while spokesmen for both communist powers condemn in similar fashion the 24 November 1971 Anglo-Rhodesian agreement. In the face of a steady diet of Soviet propaganda denunciations of the Anglo-Rhodesian accord and other "colonialist" phenomena in Africa, Peking has had little ammunition with which to counter the Soviet attacks on PRC policy in Africa. A lengthy NCNA commentary on 31 December, for example, on the medium and small nations' united front against "the two superpowers," explicitly scored Soviet policy vis-a-vis India and Pakistan and the 1968 intervention of Czechoslovakia, but attacked only the alleged policies of Portugal and "the United States and its allies" on the African continent.

Moscow has leveled its heaviest attacks against Peking's stance on Rhodesia via the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress in English to Africa. Thus a typical commentary broadcast on 27 December, on the PRC's behavior as a newly elected member of the United Nations, observed that while "in its propaganda Peking is sparing no efforts" in its condemnation of "the racist and colonialist regimes in Africa," it is actually "maintaining with them a most favorable trade, being thereby one of those who are thwarting the trade and economic blockade against the racists and colonialists as proclaimed by the Organization for African Unity." The broadcast went on to charge that "the Peking leaders are sabotaging the economic sanctions imposed against the Rhodesian racists" by purchasing large quantities of Rhodesian chrome ore. It added that the Peking leaders are "hindering the alliance of the national liberation movement forces" by supporting the ZANU movement against ZAPU in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia).

An 11 December broadcast by Radio Moscow in English to Africa, in which Observer Vasiliy Stepanov answered questions purportedly from listeners in Africa, similarly charged that the Peking leaders were trying to "split the national liberation movement" in Rhodesia, as well as in Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa. It added that, "in Rhodesia, China buys chrome." These policies, it declared, were aimed at "turning Africa into a seat of Maoism."

CONFIDENTIAL

VBITS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 28 -

Both Moscow and Peking had issued authoritative condemnations of the late-November settlement between Britain and Rhodesia, in a TASS statement on 3 December and in a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article carried by NCNA on 5 December. Avoiding any Sino-Soviet nuances, the two pronouncements reserved their venom for Britain and Rhodesia, although the PEOPLE'S DAILY article added the charge that the United States, in defiance of the will of the African countries in the United Nations, had "obdurately stuck to its position of importing chrome from Rhodesia." Soviet media, both before and after the TASS statement, carried a succession of commentaries denouncing the Anglo-Rhodesian accord. NCNA did no more than selectively report such denunciations in a Lusaka, Zambia-dated item on 1 December, an Afro-Asian Journalists Association statement on the 4th, and a speech by PRC deputy delegation head Chen Chu in the U.N. Security Council on the 8th.

In the recent period, a British veto of a Somali-sponsored Security Council resolution condemning the Anglo-Rhodesian accord was scored in a Skobelev commentary carried by TASS on the 31st and in NCNA's 3 January account of a speech by the PRC's permanent representative Huang Hua to the Security Council on the 30th.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 29 -

PRC-JAPAN

PEKING REITERATES ITS CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER SENKAKUS

Reacting to recent legislative action in the United States and Japan on the Okinawan reversion agreement, Peking has issued its most authoritative and detailed pronouncement to date on the Tiaoyu (Senkaku) island question. A 30 December Foreign Ministry statement firmly declared that the Okinawan reversion agreement does not alter "the sovereignty of the PRC over her territory of the Tiaoyu and other islands." No specific course of action was outlined, however, as the statement argued that since the disputed islands are "appertaining to Taiwan" their recovery is linked to the eventual recovery of Taiwan. The statement did not demand settlement of the Tiaoyu island issue as a specific prerequisite for ameliorating relations between China and Japan.

"Like Taiwan," the statement declared, the Tiaoyu island group has "been an inalienable part of Chinese territory since ancient times," and "it is utterly illegal for the U.S. and Japanese governments to include China's Tiaoyu and other islands in the so-called 'area of reversion' in the Okinawan 'reversion' agreement." Drawing a sharp distinction between the Japanese people and the Japanese Government, the statement specifically castigated the Sato Government for working in "collusion with U.S. imperialism" to reach an agreement on the "'reversion'" of Okinawa which includes "the Tiaoyu and other islands in the 'area of reversion.'" Reiterating Peking's standard line on the Okinawan reversion agreement, the statement portrayed it as a "fraud . . . jointly contrived by the U.S. and Japanese governments . . . to strengthen U.S.-Japanese military collusion and to accelerate the revival of Japanese militarism." It then asserted that the Chinese Government and people support "the Japanese people's valiant struggle to smash the fraud of the 'reversion' of Okinawa" and to oppose the attempt by the "U.S. and Japanese reactionaries" to use the agreement "to sow seeds of discord in the friendly relations between the peoples of China and Japan."

Following release of the Foreign Ministry statement, NCNA carried an article which went beyond the issues contained in the statement and aimed an additional volley at "Japanese reactionaries" for working in "collusion with the Chiang Kai-shek clique" in an attempt--proposed in November 1970--to jointly develop "the oil resources of the seabed and subsoil of the seas around these islands" by "temporarily 'shelving' the dispute over the title to these islands."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

5 JANUARY 1972

- 30 -

CHINA

JOINT EDITORIAL AT NEW YEAR SKIRTS LEADERSHIP ISSUE

The New Year's Day editorial of PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, while plainly reflecting the recent leadership changes in China, sheds no new light on the reasons for the changes or their ultimate effect. Recent media references to intrigue and conspiracy are given Mao's personal imprimatur via the instruction to "Practice Marxism and not revisionism; unite and don't split; be open and aboveboard, and don't intrigue and conspire."

There is no indication in the editorial that the coming year will see any expansion of the recent purge. Stressing Mao's injunctions for unity around the center's line, the editorial states that the old principle of "curing the sickness to save the patient" must be applied to those who have fallen into error and unity can be reached with those "who have wrongly opposed us but are sincerely correcting their mistakes." But the editorial does also reiterate Mao's October 1968 instruction that in party building it is necessary to "get rid of the stale and take in the fresh."

ROLE OF PLA In line with recent practice, the political role of the PLA receives less attention. The editorial emphasizes that the PLA must reform itself and "raise its political and military qualities higher." Lin Piao's "four good" standards for improving army units, mentioned in last year's editorial in this regard, have dropped out of PRC media.

The most obvious sign of the PLA's changed status comes in a well-known Mao quote which has been revised since its inclusion in last year's editorial. Last year Mao was said to have enjoined: "In industry learn from Taching; in agriculture learn from Tachai; the whole nation should learn from the PLA." The editorial this year adds a final phrase: "the Liberation Army should learn from the people of the whole country." Broadly intimating that army opposition to the new diplomatic line is a cause of the purge of PLA leaders, the editorial singles out "armymen and people" in enjoining study of "the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 31 -

international situation and the party's line and policies in foreign affairs" and defense against both "aggression and subversion."*

To greet the traditional "support the army and cherish the people" campaign, the State Council and the CCP Military Commission issued a circular on 3 January, and this too reaffirms the army's lessened status. Like the joint editorial, the circular quotes Mao to the effect that the army must learn from the people; it also affirms that the PLA must improve discipline and follow the party's guidance.

Last year separate circulars for the PLA and for civilians were issued by the State Council and the PLA General Political Department. The change this year to a single circular issued by the Government and a party organ seems designed to stress the PLA's subordination to state and party. The circulars last year stressed the achievements of the PLA and its role as "mainstay of the dictatorship of the proletariat." The phrase is repeated this year, but in the context of several paragraphs on the importance of the masses and of the local cadres.

PARTY Perhaps in part because the issue was thoroughly covered by the special joint editorial of 30 November, the current editorial devotes little attention to party leadership, simply noting that the principle should be followed. More attention is devoted to informing party members that they must still learn from the masses and be concerned for their well-being. Unlike last year, there is no closing slogan wishing long life to "the great, glorious and correct Communist Party of China."

PRC CLAIMS RECORD HARVEST, TEN PERCENT INDUSTRIAL GAIN

Both the joint editorial and a NCNA roundup on 31 December broke with the pattern established after the fiasco of the "leap forward" by providing concrete figures for grain yields and for outputs of some major industrial products. Total value of industrial and agricultural output was said to be

* For a discussion of foreign policy aspects of the editorial, see the "Sino-Soviet-U.S. Relations" section of this Trends.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 32 -

up about 10 percent over last year. While the actual figures may be somewhat exaggerated, they are consistent with those for 1970 given Edgar Snow in his interview with Chou En-lai last year. Also, again without reference to magnitude, the Chinese have been selective in their economic claims in recent years, choosing not to make claims in relation to preceding years unless in a direction actually reflected by yields.

AGRICULTURE China's grain output was said to be 246 million tons this year; this compares with the "over 240 million" figure cited by Chou En-lai for the 1970 harvest. This year's record was said to have been achieved despite the obstacle of natural disasters three times as great as last year. Much credit is given to irrigation projects and advances in mechanization and in supplies of fertilizers.

From figures given in the NCNA account and by Chou En-lai it appears that the gains in fertilizer production were almost exclusively in output from small local plants, whose product is of relatively lower quality. These plants are now said to account for 60 percent of China's supply, indicating a rise in local production for the year of about two-thirds over 1970.

Besides claiming that China is now "self-sufficient in grain and has a surplus," the NCNA report notes that output of some industrial crops, whose cultivation has increasingly been urged by propagandists, was stepped up this year. Some crops for which increases were not claimed are apparently being encouraged by new pricing policies. The report states that state purchase prices for sugar cane and beets, oil-bearing crops, and bast-fiber crops have been raised.

INDUSTRY Industrial production seems generally to have risen more in fields given special emphasis in the media over the past year. Thus mining machinery, which has been the focus of numerous articles stressing that steel cannot be made without ore, showed a gain of nearly 70 percent, the largest percentage gain given. Iron ore output increased by 26 percent.

Although excessive concentration on metallurgical equipment has been a charge aimed at the Liuist "swindlers," production of metallurgical equipment is said to be up nearly one-quarter. Total steel output is said to have reached 21 million tons; Chou had indicated that the 1970 figure was around 18 million, but he told Snow that "a rapid increase is expected this year."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 33 -

HUNAN HOLDS SECOND PARTY PLENUM, FIRST PROVINCE TO DO SO

On 26 December, the Changsha radio reported on Hunan's second provincial party plenum, held from 13 to 20 December--about one year plus two weeks following the first plenum. This could be an indication of a pattern of anniversary plenums to be followed by other provinces, but it is also possible that Hunan, as Mao's native province, will stand alone in holding a plenum amidst the unsolved leadership problems at the center.

A total of 79 members and alternates attended the plenum, against the 90 named to the new committee a year ago; but some may have absented themselves because of illness or other duties. The December 1970 announcement of the committee's formation did not state that all members were present; and, to cite one known example, Hsieh Fu-chih failed to attend the congress and plenum that confirmed his election as Peking first secretary.

Hunan has probably fared better than most provinces in the upheavals this fall. Its first secretary Hua Kuo-feng has been promoted to a post in Peking, the only provincial chief who has so far risen in the aftermath of Lin's downfall. The secretary and deputy secretary, respectively commissar and commander of the military district, both attended the plenum.

The plenum apparently discussed political and economic tasks, stressing party leadership over all areas. Although Lin was not mentioned by the plenum report, a speech by deputy secretary Yang Ta-i on party leadership and Mao's line and a discussion of 10 measures on "repudiation of revisionism and rectification of work style" were probably concerned with Lin's fate. The conference also discussed a 10-year plan for industrialization and agricultural mechanization. Other provinces have also recently referred to 10-year plans, and it may be that provincial planning generally is to proceed on a 10-year basis.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 34 -

MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW SEES U.S. PHANTOM DECISION AS THREATENING PEACE

Moscow responds in predictable fashion to President Nixon's statement, in his 2 January CBS interview, that the United States has made a "commitment in principle" to sell additional jet aircraft to Israel. TASS in reporting the interview on the 3d typifies Soviet reaction in declaring that the decision shows that the United States continues to aid the "aggressor" and thus creates obstacles to a political settlement. Moscow radio's Cairo correspondent Kudryavtsev, in an Arabic-language broadcast on the 4th, says Cairo observers point out that President Nixon announced the decision at the time Jarring's mission was to be resumed. Kudryavtsev asserts that U.S. media have been trying to portray the decision as a quid pro quo for Mrs. Meir's undertaking, in her meeting with the President, to make concessions, but that this has been denied by an Israeli spokesman.

A Potemkin article in PRAVDA on the 3d and one by Nikanorov in IZVESTIYA on the 4th claim the U.S. decision disproves Washington's assertions of lack of bias in the Middle East and ends U.S. attempts to play the role of an impartial mediator. Potemkin sees the discarding of the "farcical unofficial embargo" on the sale of Phantoms to Israel as evidence of the tremendous influence of Zionist circles on the U.S. Government, and Nikanorov similarly calls the decision the result of Zionist pressure "capable of influencing the outcome of the presidential election."

Moscow had promptly noted, in a 31 December Arabic-language broadcast, reports by U.S. media that day that the United States had decided to resume the sale of Phantoms to Israel, but at first gave the development little further publicity other than to report Cairo press "indignation." TASS on 1 January cited a statement by an unidentified Egyptian "informed source"--also quoted by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY--that such reports are considered as encouraging Israel's expansionist policy and aggravating the Middle East crisis. The Egyptian official spokesman's statement, reported by MENA on the 4th, is briefly cited by TASS the following day as declaring that the U.S. decision to supply more Phantoms to Israel is a challenge to world public opinion, creating a still more dangerous situation in the area.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 35 -

An Arabic-language commentary on the 3d pegged to the U.S. decision approvingly cited Arab press comment advocating "decisive measures" against imperialist interests in the Arab world. A Primakov article in the 5 January PRAVDA, as reported by TAS, routinely assails U.S. assistance to Israel without mentioning the Phantom issue. Primakov remarks that "objective observers" draw the conclusion that the United States, while supporting Israel's "aggressive policy," fears for its positions in the Arab countries "where its principal economic interests in the Middle East are concentrated."

PRIMAKOV URGES POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN YEAR-END REVIEW

Former PRAVDA Middle East specialist Yevgeniy Primakov, now deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economy and International Relations, again underscored Soviet support for a political settlement in a year-end radio series touching on various aspects of the Middle East situation. And in a 5 January PRAVDA article, Primakov again presses Moscow's proposals for a political settlement, as he had done in a Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable on 19 December, and expresses the belief that many conditions are available for normalizing the Middle East situation.

Primakov's series of four talks, broadcast in the Arabic service 27-30 December, employs some of the same arguments and touches on some of the same themes as the series of talks by Maksimov broadcast in Arabic in November.* In his first installment, Primakov dealt with the military balance in the Middle East, stressing that there is a "tendency" toward an equilibrium but that the process of achieving a balance of military power between the Arabs and Israel "is long and complex." As an example of Egypt's improved military position, Primakov--like Maksimov in November--cited the September downing of an Egyptian aircraft by Israel, the downing of an Israeli plane in return, and Israeli retaliatory action in firing Shrike air-to-ground missiles at Arab positions "for the first time" with "mediocre results." (Maksimov said the Shrike salvo "caused no harm or losses to the Egyptian forces.") Primakov assured his listeners that the trend toward military equilibrium "is developing," and declared that the Soviet Union furnishes "the

* The Maksimov commentaries are discussed in the 24 November TRENDS, pages 20-21, and the 1 December TRENDS, pages 18-19.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 36 -

appropriate conditions" for strengthening Arab military power. He recalled the Soviet declaration, in the joint communique on Egyptian President as-Sadat's October visit to Moscow, that the USSR would continue to render "whatever is necessary to strengthen the military power" of Egypt.

While Primakov asserted that these Soviet measures "are continuing," he left the impression that the military negotiations might not have been entirely smooth. He juxtaposed to his remark on the "continuing" measures the observation that Soviet-Arab relations "as a whole" developed successfully, but immediately conceded that 1971 "was very complicated from this aspect as well." He explained that events in certain Arab countries, such as the "anticommunist hysteria" in Sudan, were exploited by imperialist propaganda in an effort to foster Soviet-Arab differences. Recalling that Ponomarev was visiting Egypt during the anti-communist campaign in Sudan, Primakov said "the wisdom of the Egyptian statesmen prevailed" in that the communique on Ponomarev's visit condemned hostility toward communism, as did the later communique on as-Sadat's Moscow visit.

In the context of further attempts to exploit "differences of opinion" between certain Arab countries and the USSR, Primakov in his second talk implicitly responded to Arab criticism--most vociferously from Libya--of the Soviet position on the Indian-Pakistani conflict. He rejected the "inadmissible" contention that the Arabs should support Pakistan in all its actions because it is a Moslem country, and argued that the Islamic label in itself does not make a movement or a country good or bad. In his third talk Primakov gave the standard propaganda assessment of Washington's "so-called good offices" in efforts for an interim settlement along with a routine picture of Israel's "growing international isolation."

Primakov's concluding talk emphasized a Middle East political settlement, mentioned 10 times in four paragraphs. Like Makismov, who had declared that support for a political settlement did not mean peace at any price, Primakov explained that such a solution does not mean searching for "peace in any way possible." Rather, the Soviet Union, he said, equates a political settlement with the struggle to eliminate the consequences of "Israeli aggression." Also like Maksimov, Primakov insisted that there is no contradiction between seeking a political solution and assisting the Arabs in consolidating their "defense capability" since the stronger the Arabs become militarily, the more rapidly a political settlement will be achieved.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 37 -

Primakov also touched on the importance of recognition of the Palestinians' legitimate rights in any settlement. He observed that the Palestinian movement has been weakened militarily as a result of attacks by extreme rightist elements which exploited "leftist actions by some Palestinian groups." But he noted that every liberation movement has its ups and downs, and asserted that the Palestinian movement must still be taken into account, particularly in light of the support it receives from the Arab people "and the Soviet Union."

But while pledging unspecified Soviet support to the Arab Palestinians, Primakov typically offered no suggestions for solving the Palestinian problem and indeed immediately went on to reiterate, in effect, Israel's right to exist: The Soviet Union, he said, "wants all countries in this area to be assured of survival and secure boundaries for these countries maintained." Otherwise, he concluded, a situation might arise which could again activate "imperialist forces" and jeopardize Arab revolutionary achievements and progressive changes.

SOVIET PROPOSALS Primakov in the broadcast series did not take the occasion to mention the Soviet proposals for a Middle East settlement, but in a 5 January PRAVDA article he does bring up the subject. The proposals are not known to have been detailed in Soviet propaganda since Primakov outlined them in a 15 October 1970 PRAVDA article.

Affirming that the USSR stands for a political settlement, Primakov analyzes "specific features" of the Soviet measures in his PRAVDA article, listing first the need for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories along with simultaneous termination of the state of war and establishment of peace between Israel and the Arab states. Primakov observes that it is "evidently necessary" to call attention to the fact that only the borders established for Israel by the United Nations in 1947 have a basis in international law. In the roundtable discussion on 19 December, Primakov had noted that the Soviet proposals aim at insuring the existence of "generally recognized frontiers" in the area, and Israel could find security in this recognition of "existing frontiers." In PRAVDA, he declares that the Soviet plan is a "well-considered system of measures to provide guarantees for the security of the borders of all countries" in the region, including guarantees by "a number of great powers" or the UN Security Council or both.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 38 -

Primakov advises the Arabs that a "major prerequisite" for a successful struggle is the solidarity and unity of the Arab countries themselves on an anti-imperialist basis, and cautions them that imperialism is "trying to capitalize on differences between Arab countries in their approach to the solution of individual problems."

Expressing the opinion that many conditions are available for normalizing the situation, Primakov points to Resolution 242 as a basis for a political settlement and says the resolution could be implemented now. He recalls Israel's failure to give "an official reply" to Ambassador Jarring's 8 February 1971 memorandum, but does not, according to the TASS review, call for a positive Israeli reply now--a condition set by Egyptian President as-Sadat in his 11 November speech to the People's Assembly.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 39 -

YUGOSLAVIA

FOREIGN CURRENCY ISSUE RESOLVED, TITO CRACKDOWN CONTINUES

Federal and republic authorities, at Tito's insistence, have agreed to a compromise solution of the controversial foreign currency problem--the issue that triggered the 10-day November-December strike by Croatian students and was seized upon by Tito as an opportunity for a showdown with the Croatian leaders. At the same time, the Yugoslav President has sustained his pressure on nationalist and other dissident elements throughout the country. A League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Presidium document on the tasks of the party, published in the 30 December BORBA in preparation for the second League conference, calls for a continuing struggle against the class enemy and warns that there will be no democracy for those who try to undermine the system. According to TANJUG, the Zagreb city committee of the League of Communists met on the 30th and decided on a thorough housecleaning of all "champions of nationalist ideology" in all conference organizations and "particularly of some university professors."

Meanwhile, the media continue to carry isolated reports of Croatian unrest and arrests of Croatian citizens for "nationalist excesses." Demonstrating that the Yugoslav authorities' crackdown on nationalist elements extends to other republics as well, TANJUG reported on the 30th that the Serbian security police had arrested Slobodan Subotic, the chairman of both the Serbian and Yugoslav bar associations, for "hostile activity against the state." Subotic, and an unemployed engineer and five other unidentified persons arrested with him, were charged specifically with writing, printing, and distributing nationalist, anti-communist propaganda.

REFORM OF
FOREIGN EXCHANGE

Following Tito's 18 December demand for a rapid solution to the foreign exchange problem--long a cause of discontent in

Croatia--the Federal and republican authorities reached an agreement on the controversial question, TANJUG reported on the 29th. According to the agreement, Croatia and the other republics will be allowed to keep more of their foreign currency earnings. Where in the past exporters were allowed to keep only 7 percent of these funds, the reform allows them to keep 20 percent. It also provides for an increase from 40 to 45 percent for foreign exchange earnings from tourism.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 40 -

In an apparent effort to sell the reform to the Croatians, the Zagreb daily VJESNIK on 1 January carried a lengthy interview with Ratko Karlovic, a member of the Council of the Croatian Assembly, in which he hailed the agreement as a victory for commonsense rather than a triumph of any individual republic. Acknowledging that no republic got all it wanted, he cautioned that "results would not follow automatically" from the reform agreement and urged Croatians to use their "business acumen to take advantage of the opportunities" provided by the new measures.

LCY PRESIDIUM DOCUMENT The 29 December meeting of the LCY Presidium-- the third within a month--resulted in a

Presidium document entitled "The Development and Current Tasks of the LCY" published in BORBA the next day. According to TANJUG, the document is designed to serve as a basis for public debate in preparation for the second LCY conference scheduled for 25-26 January, which will take up the problem of the League's reorganization. Judging by the content of the document, TANJUG commented on the 29th, "a further sharpening can be expected in the open clash between the LCY and those trends which put obstacles in the way of reinforcing the decisive role of the working class."

Describing the present situation as one of "deepening ferment" in many sectors of Yugoslav life, the document warns against efforts of "nationalist and other opponents" to challenge the class basis of the Yugoslav revolutionary movement and calls for a strengthened party to deal with them. It pointedly adds that there will be no democracy for those who seek to undermine the Yugoslav social system. Attempting to maintain a middle position between nationalists and unitarists, who prefer strong central rule, the document goes on to voice opposition to any concept that would lead to a loose coalition of republican organizations or to any restoration of "centralistic, supra-republican organization." Although the document professes to envisage more autonomy for republic parties in the planned reorganization, it emphasizes that the principle of democratic centralism must be observed "from top to bottom" and underlines that the prime goal of the League reorganization must be to strengthen the party's role in political and social life throughout the country.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 41 -

NEW INCIDENTS
IN CROATIA

Although the compromise solution on the foreign currency issue may assuage Croatian grievances and bolster the new Croatian party leadership, the problem of republic nationalism and the new animosities generated between the Croats and the Belgrade center by Tito's intervention in Croatian affairs will continue to pose difficulties. The Yugoslav authorities' concern over this problem seemed reflected in press reports on 28 and 29 December that the ousted leaders--Dabcevic-Kucar, Tripalo, and Pirker--had requested that the Zagreb daily VJESNIK publish their statements dissociating themselves from "some individuals and small groups" who are using their names and who support "hostile positions." According to TANJUG reports on 13 and 14 December on student protests in the wake of the ouster of the Croatian leaders, the demonstrators had shouted slogans expressing support for Dabcevic-Kucar and Tripalo. Although there have been no new reports of such manifestations, Zagreb's VJESNIK reported on 3 January that seven youths were sent to prison for 60 days for singing nationalist songs. The same paper also reported that four persons in Bosanka Krupa were given similar sentences for "nationalist and chauvinist excesses and insults to the highest organs of authority of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."

According to a TANJUG report on 5 January, a mail room employee in BORBA's Zagreb printing plant was killed by an exploding parcel which the police assumed contained a time bomb. TANJUG on the 1st had reported that Yugoslav customs officers on the Yugoslav-Greek border apprehended two persons attempting to smuggle mines into the country.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
5 JANUARY 1972

- 42 -

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

RELATED PUBLICATION OF STALIN-ERA HISTORY ANNOUNCED

PRAVDA on 29 December announces the publication of the long-awaited Book 2, Volume 4 in the official multivolume "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." This work deals with the most sordid period of Stalin's regime, the 1929-37 era of the collectivization of agriculture, the assassination of Kirov, and the launching of the great terror. Publication was suspended in late 1970, presumably because of unresolved differences in the leadership over the Stalin issue or concern over the book's potentially disruptive impact on public opinion, and another, later book in the series was released in January 1971, covering the 1938-45 period.*

The new work will provide the most up-to-date and comprehensive assessment of Stalin by Khrushchev's successors. However, in view of Brezhnev's statement at the 24th CPSU Congress that the "problems" connected with the Stalin cult have "irrevocably receded into the past," it seems likely that the new work will not depart markedly from those historical assessments of recent years which have uniformly extolled the virtues of the "heroic" past while muting criticism of Stalin's "mistakes."

* For background, see the TRENDS for 3 February 1971, pages 38-39.

CONFIDENTIAL